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Environmental Protection and Native American Rights:
Controlling Land Use Through
Environmental Regulation
Judith V. Royster
Indian nations today are faced with a critical Teri
dichotomy in their treatment by the federal
government. For the most part, Congress has
embarked on a path of promoting and sine
encouraging economic development and self-
sufficiency, while the Supreme Court has taken
virtually every opportunity in recent years to
undercut the legal and practical basis of
reservation self-government. Nowhere is this dichotomy
more starkly illustrated than in the environmental arena.
For the past decade, Congress and the Environmental
Protection Agency have been promoting and strengthening the
tribal role in environmental regulation of Indian territories.
Each of the major federal pollution control acts that has come
up for reauthorization has been amended to include provisions
that treat Indian tribes as states for environmental protection
purposes. Tribal primacy over environmental regulation on
Indian lands is both expected and encouraged. The Supreme
Court, on the other hand, has hobbled the ability of many
Indian nations to take full control over environmental affairs
in their territories. In 1989, the Court held that when an
Indian reservation has significant non-Indian ownership, the
tribe is divested of authority to zone the non-Indian lands.'
Land use planning and environmental regulation are, of
course, different concepts. Land use planning is concerned
primarily with actual use of the land, while environmental
regulation is concerned with controlling the environmental
damage resulting from use of the land. 2 Nonetheless, land use
controls represent a prior restraint on pollution problems:
separating, controlling, and preventing environmentally
incompatible uses of neighboring lands. 3 Accordingly, a
government that has lost the authority to zone its lands-the
authority to control land use planning-has lost as well the
full capability to control environmentally harmful land uses.
It can neither exclude those uses altogether, nor control the
location of those uses that are permitted.
This is the position in which the Supreme Court has placed
Indian tribes. Those tribes whose reservations contain
significant non-Indian land ownership have lost the authority
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to regulate land use planning on the non-
Indian lands. Consequently, those tribes have
lost their first-line environmental defense:
control of the location of environmentally
harmful activities. Despite the broken
promise of zoning, however, Indian nations
are not bereft of all control. As the tribal role
in environmental protection in Indian country
expand, environmental regulation may hold an
emerging promise for Indian tribes: the renewal of at least
some measure of control over the use of the land itself.
This article will explore the nexus between land use
planning and environmental regulation in Indian country.4
The first section will briefly review the background issues:
tribal sovereignty and reservation land tenure. The second
section will discuss land use planning in Indian country, and
the third section will concentrate on environmental regulation.
Finally, the fourth section will explore the effects of the
discrepancy between the territorial reach of tribal zoning
powers and the territorial extent of tribal environmental
authority. The article will conclude that tribal environmental
controls, which extend to the full reach of Indian country,
hold a promise for the Indian nations-that land uses beyond
their zoning control will at least be environmentally sound.
Sovereignty, Territory, and Land Tenure
The fundamental issues in land use and environmental
controls in Indian country revolve around one basic question:
who decides? Any land-based issue necessarily involves the
often-competing jurisdictional roles of three distinct
sovereigns-the tribe, the state, and the federal government.
Moreover, these issues require a determination of the
territorial extent of each sovereign's rights in Indian country,
and that territorial reach in turn depends upon the particular
land tenure configuration of the Indian country at issue.
Territory is the sine qua non of sovereignty. Although
most sovereigns exercise complete authority within the
confines of their territories, the Indian nations are unique.
Despite their recognized status as sovereign governments,
tribes often find the territorial extent of their sovereign powers
curtailed. Depredations on the Indian estate over the history of
the Republic have led to a modem land tenure system in much
of Indian country that apportions governmental authority by
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land ownership. The result is a checkerboard of sovereign
territorial power.
Land tenure in Indian country
Governmental authority in Indian country is often
dependent upon the intricacies of land tenure. Within tribal
territories, there are four basic types of land ownership: tribal
trust land, Indian allotments, Indian fee land, and non-Indian
fee land. The rights of any sovereign to govern activities
within Indian country may vary with the type of land on
which those activities take place.
Originally, all Indian country was land set aside for the
exclusive use and occupation of the tribe to whom the land
belonged. 5 Although Indian country was territory designated
as homelands for the tribes,6 the lands were-and still are-
held in trust status by the United States government. Indian
land that is held in trust cannot be alienated, restricted, or
encumbered without the consent of the United States. 7 Today,
virtually all tribal land of federally recognized Indian tribes is
held in trust.
Not all trust land, however, is held for the tribes. There are
also Indian allotments: lands held in trust for individual
Indians. Allotted land held in trust for individuals is an
outgrowth of the failed 19th century experiment in imposing
private ownership on Indian peoples. In 1887, Congress
enacted the General Allotment Act,8 which allotted to each
Indian head of household a set number of acres, 9 to be held in
trust for twenty-five years and then patented in fee to the
Indian owner.10 Although considerable land was allotted, and
thousands of patents issued, subsequent remedial legislation
extended the trust period on any allotment not yet patented."I
Today the trust status of Indian allotments on which patents
have not been issued is permanent. 12
The General Allotment Act led to more than allotment to
individual Indians, however. Once the allotment parcels were
allocated, the remainder of the reservation territories was
declared "surplus" land and opened to non-Indian
settlement. 13 In addition, when a patent in fee was issued to an
Indian allottee, the land lost its trust status and became subject
to encumbrance and alienation. 14 For many Indian
landowners, this meant the loss of the land to repossession or
sale for back taxes; purchasers at these sales were almost
inevitably non-Indian. Even though the Allotment Act was
not extended to all tribes, and patents in fee did not issue after
1934,15 approximately two-thirds of all Indian lands were lost
to non-Indian ownership. 16
Although some tribes were unaffected by allotment, many
others emerged from the allotment era with checkerboard
reservations. On these reservations, a jumble of tribal trust
lands, Indian allotments, and non-Indian fee lands exists in a
patchwork. This checkerboard of land tenure, in turn, gives
rise to jurisdictional disputes. Although tribal governmental
authority over Indians on Indian lands is unquestioned, states
increasingly are gaining regulatory jurisdiction over non-
Indians and non-Indian lands within Indian country.
Territory and sovereignty
Control over Indian land and resources implicates the
jurisdictional claims of three sovereigns: the tribes, the states,
and the federal government. To a different degree, each
sovereign asserts its right to control decision making with
respect to the land within Indian territory and its uses.
Federal authority within Indian country stems from
Congress' plenary power over the Indian nations. 17 Plenary
power, grounded in the colonial doctrine of discovery' 8 and
incorporated into the Constitution,' 9 permits Congress to
exercise virtually unlimited power over the Indian nations,
their lands, and their sovereignty. 20 Subject to the restraints
of the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment 2' and the
general trust responsibility that the federal government has
toward Indian lands, 22 Congress is empowered to legislate
specifically as to the Indian nations. Using this power, the
federal government has exercised its authority over both
Indian lands and resources. 23 Moreover, in addition to
specific regulation of Indian lands and activities, federal laws
with only general applicability often apply to Indians and
Indian tribes. 24  For example, the federal government has
extended application of general legislation such as pollution
control laws to the territories of the Indian tribes. 25
Nonetheless, the paramount sovereign in Indian country is
the tribe. Despite the doctrine of plenary power and the
constraints that the Supreme Court persists in placing on tribal
sovereign powers, Indian tribal sovereignty remains a
recognized and abiding fact. 26 The Indian nations are
sovereign governments, exercising inherent governmental
authority over their peoples and their territories. 27 As to
internal social and political affairs-matters involving tribal
citizens and tribal land-the Indian tribes retain full sovereign
powers to govern. 28
Nevertheless, Indian nations today exercise less than full
sovereign powers. In the classic phrase, Indian tribes are
"domestic dependent nations, '29 subject to certain restrictions
upon their national sovereignty. For nearly two hundred years
these restrictions were narrowly defined: Indian tribes could
not freely alienate their lands to, nor engage in foreign
relations with, any power other than the United States. 30 In
the last decade and a half, however, the Supreme Court has
significantly curtailed the remaining sovereign powers of the
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tribes. Increasingly, the Court has stripped tribes of their
sovereign powers over non-Indian individuals, activities, and
lands on the theory that tribes have been implicitly divested of
inherent sovereignty as to non-Indians by virtue of their
"dependent" status.31 Even these restrictions on the so-called
external powers of tribal sovereignty were subject to
significant limitations, however. Tribes retained the inherent
governmental power to regulate non-
Indians, non-Indian conduct, and non- In the la
Indian land when non-Indian activities
threatened or directly affected tribal
political or economic stability or the a half...
health or welfare of the tribe.32
Emboldened by the doctrine of implicit
divestiture of tribal authority, states Court has
increasingly asserted the right to control
non-Indian activity in Indian country. In curtailed t
virtually all instances, the federal courts
emphatically rejected state attempts to
regulate non-Indian conduct on Indian soverei
lands within reservation boundaries. 33
State jurisdiction over non-Indians on non-
Indian lands, however, has received a far of t]
more favorable reception. 34 Courts
generally permit this degree of state
authority when the courts perceive that the sovereign tribal
interest in regulating the non-Indian conduct is minimal. The
Supreme Court appears increasingly willing to find that the
tribal governmental interest in comprehensive and long-range
resource planning is insufficient to oust state authority. In
two cases in the past decade, the Court has permitted state
jurisdiction over non-Indians on non-Indian land even though
that authorization has created checkerboard regulation of
resources.
35
In tribal territories with significant non-Indian ownership,
then, states are often permitted jurisdiction over non-Indian
activities on fee lands, at least where the courts deem the
tribal interest in regulating the non-Indians to be minimal.
The resultant patchwork of governmental authority not only
undermines the territorial sovereignty of the tribes, but is
unwieldy and ultimately unworkable. Checkerboard
jurisdiction over resource use discourages long-range
planning, hinders comprehensive resource management, and
breeds conflict and distrust.
Both tribes and states fear that resource control by the
other will lead to the use of Indian country as the dumping
ground for non-Indian environmental problems. States are
concerned that Indian country provides industry with an
opportunity to pollution shop: to choose the location with less
bureaucratic regulation, lower environmental standards, and
fewer and lower taxes. 36 The fear of spillovers-harmful
effects outside Indian country from activities within it-is the
reason cited most often by states as a justification for state
control. Yet "[s]pillovers spill over both ways," 37 and the
Indian nations in turn fear that relatively pristine, isolated
Indian country
st decade and
the Supreme
significantly
;he remaining
gn powers
he tribes.
will be subject to degradation from state
activities located upwind and upstream of
the reservations. The limited land area of
most Indian country exacerbates this
concern; any environmental harm from
resource development, industrial
pollution, and waste facilities may well
affect most of a tribe's territory. 38
Moreover, the tribes are concerned that
remote and sparsely populated lands in
Indian country will be favored by state
planners as attractive locations for
environmentally harmful activities. 39
The right to control environmental
decision making in Indian country thus
implicates the jurisdictional concerns of
three governments. Although the Indian
nations, both from a practical and a
sovereignty perspective, are the optimum
government to control and manage reservation lands and
resources, 40 federal plenary power and state assertions of
jurisdiction complicate any land-related issue. In particular,
these jurisdictional claims have focused in recent years on the
right to control conduct affecting the land itself. Moreover,
the jurisdictional questions are complicated by land tenure.
States assert a greater right to jurisdiction, at least as to non-
Indians, in tribal territories with checkerboard land ownership.
It was, for example, on a reservation with a patchwork pattern
that the modem zoning issue arose.
The Broken Promise of Zoning
Prior to 1989, Indian nations opposed to non-Indian
activity within tribal territories that would cause
environmental damage had a relatively easy and
straightforward approach: they could zone reservation lands to
prevent, or at least to control the location of, environmentally
harmful concerns. Tribal zoning authority stemmed from
inherent tribal sovereignty and encompassed the activities of
non-Indians on non-Indian fee land within Indian country. In
1981, in Montana v. United States,4 1 the United States
Supreme Court reaffirmed the right of Indian tribes to regulate
non-Indians, even on non-Indian fee land, when the non-
Indian conduct "threatens or has some direct effect on the
Summer 1991 1i
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political integrity, the economic security, or the health or
welfare of the tribe." 42
Under the Montana test, tribes were able to use their
zoning powers to control activities harmful to the
environment. Because zoning is the process by which a
government determines how its territory may be used and
ensures that neighboring uses are not destructive or even
incompatible, 43 lower federal courts had recognized that
zoning is a governmental power specifically designed to
promote health and welfare. 44 As Justice Blackmun later
observed, "[i]t would be difficult to conceive of a power more
central to 'the economic security, or the health or welfare of
the tribe,' than the power to zone."45
Thus, application of the Montana test
led courts to reaffirm tribal power to zone
Indian country, in particular to control
environmentally harmful uses. For
example, the Colville Tribal Court
preliminarily enjoined a non-Indian wood
products company, doing business on non-
Indian land, from expanding its dump site
for wood product wastes. 46 The injunction
was issued because the company refused
to comply with the Colville Interim Land
Use Development Ordinance. Similarly, a
federal court preliminarily enjoined the
construction and operation of asphalt and
cement or concrete plants on non-Indian
land within the Pinoleville Rancheria. 47 In
that case, land within the reservation was
owned in fee by non-Indians, who had
obtained the county's authorization to
public health and safety on non-Indians on non-Indian land.
Thus, lower federal courts approved measures such as the
extension of tribal building, health, and safety codes 50 and
sewer hook-up requirements 5 1 to non-Indians on fee land.
In 1989, however, the United States Supreme Court
shattered the ability of many Indian nations to control land use
in their territories. In Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and
Bands of Yakima Indian Nation,52 the Court gave county
governments significant zoning power over reservation lands.
The Court did not question the sovereign right of Indian
nations to zone trust lands within reservation boundaries, 53
but limited tribal authority to zone non-Indian lands to those
reservations or parts of reservations with "enough" non-Indian
Application of the
Montana test led courts
to reaffirm tribal power
to zone Indian country,
in particular to control
environmentally
harmful uses.
operate the plants. The tribe, however, had adopted a land use
ordinance prohibiting new industrial uses for one year. The
court upheld the tribe's right to zone the reservation lands and
found that "operation of the plants [would] threaten[] injury to
the land, water, and air, as well as the health and welfare of
the Indians of the Rancheria. ' 48 More specifically, the court
noted evidence of the following environmental effects:
increased siltation and turbidity in waters used as a spawning
ground for fish and as a water source for the reservation;
particulate and gaseous emissions that would violate state air
quality standards; storage of oil and diesel fuel; and "strong
and offensive" odors that would be detectable throughout the
tribal territory; as well as increased traffic and noise levels.49
Under the Montana analysis, courts upheld not only the
general power of Indian nations to zone and regulate land use
within the exterior boundaries of their reservations, but also
the governmental right of tribes to impose related measures of
land ownership. Where all or a part of an
Indian reservation has significant non-
Indian ownership, the state or county has
land use control over all non-Indian land.
This checkerboard outcome was the
result of the justices' inability to find a
majority for any one point of view. The
Court split 4-3-2: four justices found that
the county had exclusive zoning authority
over all non-Indian land within the
reservation; 54 three justices found that the
Indian tribe had exclusive zoning
authority over all land within the
reservation, regardless of ownership; 55
and two justices, the swing votes, found
that the county's right to zone non-Indian
land depended on the extent of non-
Indian land ownership.56
The structure of the Yakima Nation
territory also contributed to the checkerboard result. The
Yakima Reservation is divided roughly into two sections. The
so-called "open" northeastern section contains three
incorporated towns; nearly half the land in that section is
owned in fee by non-Indians, 57 and Yakima Nation members
comprise less than twenty percent of the population. 58 The
western two-thirds of the reservation, however-the "closed"
area-is primarily forest land and contains only a small
percentage of non-Indian land. 59 The Brendale decision was
based on consolidated cases brought by two owners of non-
Indian fee land who wanted to develop their parcels in
accordance with county zoning policies, but in opposition to
Yakima zoning ordinances. One of the owners had land in the
open section; the other's land was located in the closed
section.
Justice Stevens, the author of the swing decision, found
this distinction in land tenure controlling. 60 According to
The Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy
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Stevens, the deciding issue is apparently the "essential
character" of the land. 6' When a region is "almost entirely...
reserved for the exclusive benefit of the Tribe," 62 the tribe
retains the power-through zoning-to "define the essential
character of that area." 63 When a "large percentage" of the
land is owned in fee by non-Indians, however, the tribe has
ceased to be able to "establish the essential character of the
region." 64 The region then has lost its "Indian" character and
become "an integrated portion of the county," which the
county may zone as it sees fit. 65 In a masterpiece of
understatement, Justice Stevens noted that in relying on the
land's essential character, he had not created "a bright-line
rule." 6
6
The Yakima Nation had argued, consistent with the
opinions of multiple lower courts, that the Court's own
decision eight years earlier in Montana recognized the right of
Indian tribes to regulate the activities of non-Indians on non-
Indian land when those activities would "threaten[] or ha[ve]
some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe." 67 Nothing has
a more direct effect on a tribe's economy, health, and welfare,
the Yakima argued, than the use of the land. 68 Land use
planning through zoning is a fundamental method for
regulating activities that may have detrimental effects.69
The Court, in response, severely undercut the Montana
decision. The four-justice opinion, written by Justice White,
gutted the Montana test on which tribes and lower courts had
relied. Justice White noted that Montana said a tribe "may"
retain authority to regulate non-Indians when effects on tribal
health and welfare will result. 70 This one word, Justice White
concluded, means that tribal authority does not extend to all
conduct that threatens or even adversely affects tribal health
and welfare. 71 Instead, the impact of the non-Indian activity
on non-Indian land "must be demonstrably serious and must
imperil the political integrity, economic security or the health
and welfare of the tribe." 72 Only then will tribal interests
prevail.
For some tribes-like most in the Southwest, who escaped
the ravages of allotment-the Brendale decision will have
little or no effect on their ability to control land use and to
directly control the siting of environmentally harmful
activities anywhere within their territories. Because these
Indian nations have no significant non-Indian land ownership
within the boundaries of their territories, the tribes' zoning
and other land use decisions should be exclusive for all lands.
For most tribes, however, Brendale represents a serious
threat to sovereignty. Where there is "enough" non-Indian
land ownership in Indian country, the tribe may zone only the
Indian land, and the county will zone all non-Indian land. The
tribe may, of course, appear before the county zoning
commission on a use-by-use basis to plead its case and may
appeal any adverse decision to the courts, 73 but it may not
control the county's decision as to non-Indian lands within the
tribe's reservation unless there is a "demonstrably serious"
impact that "imperil[s]" the tribe or its members. 74 Even then,
it is not clear that zoning power reverts to the tribe. Justice
White's opinion, rather, indicates that a demonstrably serious
impact will still only entitle the tribe to "complain or obtain
relief."75
Justice White, however, gave no indication of how or
where a tribe should go to complain or obtain relief. If in fact
the county land use decision will have a direct, immediate,
and substantial impact on tribal health and safety-for
example, if the county authorizes a hazardous waste site-
may the tribe simply overrule the county's decision? Must the
tribe go to court for a determination? If so, which court-
state, tribal, or federal-has primary authority to hear the
dispute?
Once the tribe "complains" to the correct body, what relief
will be available? What if the zoning board or the court
determines that by conditioning a detrimental use it can lower
the impact from "imperiling" the tribe to merely adversely
affecting it? May the county or the court then condition the
proposed use rather than disallow it? Alternatively, if the
county or the court finds that the impact on tribal health and
welfare is not substantial enough, is the tribe simply stuck
with an environmentally harmful activity located in its
territory? If land use planning were the only avenue of
environmental defense available to tribes, the answer might
well be yes.
The Emerging Promise of Environmental Regulation
While the Supreme Court was curtailing Indian tribal
powers to regulate land use, Congress and the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) were taking a far different approach
to tribal powers to regulate the environment in Indian country.
The emerging promise of environmental regulation is that it
may accomplish more than the control of pollutants. It may in
fact permit tribes caught in the Brendale net to reassert at least
some degree of control over land use decisions within their
sovereign territories. 76
Direct regulation of pollution sources
In 1983, President Reagan announced his Indian policy,
with its major theme of government-to-government
relations. 77 Unlike other federal agencies, the EPA took this
presidential mandate and ran with it. The EPA promulgated
an Indian policy of its own in 1984, which recognized Indian
Summer 1991 M
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governments "as sovereign entities with primary authority and
responsibility" for environmental matters in Indian country. 78
The EPA pledged to "work directly with Tribal Governments
as the independent authority for reservation affairs, and not as
political subdivisions of States or other governmental units." 79
True to its word, the EPA instituted a legislative agenda of
amending the federal pollution control statutes, as they came
up for reauthorization, to include provisions treating Indian
tribes as states for purposes of the acts.80 Amendments to the
Safe Drinking Water Act 81 and the Superfund Act82 in 1986,
the Clean Water Act 83 in 1987, and the Clean Air Act 84 in
1990, generally provide for treating tribes as states for most or
all of the programs authorized by the acts. Under these
federal laws, authorized tribes may, for example, redesignate
reservation air quality;85 promulgate standards for reservation
air quality, general water quality, and drinking water
quality;86 and issue permits for discharges to waters within the
reservation.87
These amendments leave the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA), 88 which governs solid and hazardous
waste management, as the only major federal pollution control
act that does not yet include a tribes-as-states provision.89
RCRA comes up for reauthorization next session, however,
and all indications from the EPA and Congress are that it will
be brought into line with the other federal environmental
statutes.90 In the meantime, the EPA has interpreted RCRA's
existing structure to preclude state authority in Indian
country, 91 and that interpretation has been upheld by the
courts.
9 2
Territorial extent of tribal environmental regulation
Unlike tribal zoning authority, which the Supreme Court
has restricted to areas of "essential Indian character," tribal
control of the environment extends to the full reach of "Indian
country." And Indian country includes all lands within the
exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation, regardless of
ownership. 93 Congress, the courts, and the EPA have all
acknowledged that tribal environmental authority extends to
the entire territory of the reservation.
In part, congressional recognition of the extent of tribal
environmental authority has been implicit in the language of
the various pollution control acts. Most of these acts
expressly direct the EPA to treat tribes as states for most or all
of the programs contained in the acts. 94 With the exception of
"Indian lands," 95 states have environmental regulatory
authority over the full extent of their territories. If tribes are
to be treated "as states," then Indian tribes, by definition, must
have environmental authority as well over the full extent of
their tribal territories.
In some instances, moreover, Congress has made plain its
intent. Both the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act, for
example, expressly authorize tribal environmental control
over all lands within the tribe's Indian country. The recent
Clean Air Act amendments provide that a tribal plan for
implementation of air quality standards shall, unless expressly
provided otherwise in the tribal plan, be applicable to "all
areas" within the tribe's reservation territory. 96 Similarly, the
Clean Water Act provides for tribal authority throughout
Indian country.97 The Act also expressly provides that when
an Indian tribe assumes program authority, it will exercise
jurisdiction over water resources held by the tribe, by the
United States in trust for the tribe, or "otherwise within the
borders of an Indian reservation." 98
In addition, the EPA has expressly adopted the
congressional parameters of Indian country in its dealings
with states and tribes under the federal pollution control acts.
For example, the EPA regulations implementing the tribes-as-
states provision of the Safe Drinking Water Act state that
"Indian lands" include all Indian country. 99 The EPA,
moreover, has applied this definition to exclude state authority
within reservation boundaries even in the absence of a tribes-
as-states provision in the governing act. Since at least 1980,
the EPA has asserted continually that it, not the states, has
authority under RCRA to regulate on "Indian lands." 100 And
for RCRA purposes, the Agency defines "Indian lands" as
Indian country.101
In Washington Department of Ecology v. EPA, 102 the
federal court declared this definition a "reasonable marker" of
the territorial reach of tribal environmental authority. 103
Despite this plain statement, the intent of the court is
somewhat ambiguous. The State of Washington asserted only
its right to regulate on Indian-owned lands, and the court
specifically noted that it was not deciding whether a state
could take RCRA jurisdiction over non-Indians within Indian
country. 10 4 The EPA, however, expressly rejected the concept
of environmental checkerboarding when Washington State
subsequently petitioned for RCRA authority over non-Indian
activities within Indian country.105 The Agency reaffirmed
the territorial basis of authority: the state may regulate
outside Indian country, and the EPA-until RCRA is
amended to permit treating tribes as states-will regulate
within Indian country, regardless of the status of the land or
the person conducting the activities.
Thus, tribal environmental authority necessarily extends to
all lands, persons, and sources within Indian country. Both
Congress and the EPA have expressly provided for the full
territorial extent of tribal environmental control, and the
courts have declared this geographic demarcation to be
The Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy
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reasonable. Moreover, the EPA has specifically rejected a
patchwork approach to environmental regulation, with the
tribe regulating Indian activities and the state regulating non-
Indian activities. Not only would that approach cause a host
of practical implementation problems, but it would necessarily
interfere with the federal statutory schemes for pollution
control. If, as Congress has clearly indicated, the EPA and the
Indian nations retain environmental jurisdiction over all lands
within Indian country, then state authority over non-Indian
persons on those lands would be inconsistent with the federal
scheme. The state could not regulate non-Indian
environmental activities without necessarily infringing on
federal and tribal environmental regulation of the land.
Realizing Environmental Values in Indian Country
An anomaly of serious consequence thus has developed in
Indian country. At a time when Indian governmental control
of environmental pollution is increasingly recognized and
promoted by Congress and the EPA, the Supreme Court has
severely curtailed tribal authority over land use decisions.
Tribal environmental control has been expressly extended to
all lands and activities within Indian country; yet the Court
has restricted tribal land use control on many reservations to
lands of "essential Indian character."' 06
The Supreme Court's zoning decision in
Brendale was a direct attack on Indian Tribal e
tribal sovereignty. No government can
engage fully in long-range planning and
development when it does not have control authoritt
over the very use to which the land within
its territory is put. In much of Indian
country presently, counties are free to extends
permit land uses on non-Indian land that
are incompatible with tribal goals and persons,
needs, including uses that are
environmentally harmful. The Brendale
decision limits the tribes' ability to oppose within In
such uses.
Nevertheless, the Indian nations now possess another
weapon with which to control environmentally harmful land
uses: environmental regulation under the federal pollution
control acts. Although a tribe may not be able to prevent use
of non-Indian land unless the tribe can prove a demonstrably
serious impact that imperils the tribe,107 it may nonetheless be
able to control at least the environmental damage that might
otherwise result.
Brendale itself provides an example. In that case, an
owner of non-Indian property proposed to develop a twenty-
acre site into ten summer cabin sites. The district court found
nvi
Sne
to (
an(
ial
that this proposed development
would disrupt soil conditions; cause a
deterioration of air quality; change drainage
patterns; destroy some trees and natural
vegetation; cause a deterioration of wildlife
habitat; alter the location and density of human
population in the area; increase traffic, light, and
the use of fuel wood; and require added police
and fire protection as well as new systems for
waste disposal. 08
If a development such as this were approved by a county in an
area within Indian country where the county had authority to
zone, not all the environmental damage could be controlled.
Adverse environmental effects such as increased housing
density and increased traffic can only be controlled through
careful and comprehensive land use planning.
An Indian nation with regulatory authority under the
federal pollution control acts, however, can control some of
the environmental damage. The tribe can require that any
activity approved for non-Indian land be environmentally
sound. For example, Indian tribes long have had the authority
to redesignate the air quality of a reservation to preserve
pristine air quality. 09 In 1990 Congress
ronmental extended tribal authority under the Clean
Air Act beyond the power to redesignate;
tribes now are authorized to develop
Scessarily tribal plans for implementing,
maintaining, and enforcing air quality
1ll lands, standards."] 0 This authority surely would
permit a tribe to regulate a proposed
activity on non-Indian land in Indian
d sources country that would "cause a deterioration
of air quality" below that permitted for
the reservation airshed.
n country. Similarly, tribes are empowered under
the Clean Water Act to promulgate water
quality standards for the waters of the reservation I Il and to
regulate discharges of pollutants and dredge and fill materials
into those waters. 1 2 Using the federal authority to establish
water quality standards, Indian nations can set the level of
pollutants that will be tolerated in the waters of the tribes'
territories. 113 Subsequently, through the issuance of permits
for discharges into those waters, and through conditions
placed on permit holders, the tribes can maintain and enforce
those water quality standards. Moreover, permit authority for
dredge and fill materials reaches activities harmful to
wetlands, thus allowing tribes the opportunity to control or at
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least to minimize the environmental harm
to Indian country wetlands. 114
As tribes begin to take regulatory
authority under the federal pollution
control acts, then, their ability to impose
environmental restrictions on non-Indian
development of non-Indian land within
Indian country should increase
significantly. Tribal program authority
under statutes such as the Clean Air Act
and the Clean Water Act should permit
Environmental
regulatory authority is
not a panacea for the
loss of land use controls.
tribes to require, at a minimum, that non-Indian land use
accord with tribal environmental values.
Moreover, all indications are that the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act will be amended next session
to include the tribes-as-states provisions now found in most of
the other federal pollution control acts.' 1 5 Treatment as states
under RCRA may well empower tribes to exercise more direct
control over proposed uses of non-Indian lands within
reservation boundaries. Under RCRA program authority, for
example, a tribal permit should be required for the siting of
any hazardous waste facility within Indian country.1 16 Thus,
at least where the proposed use of Indian country is
hazardous, some measure of land use decision-making will be
returned to the government whose territory it is.
Conclusion
Environmental regulatory authority is
not a panacea for the loss of land use
controls. In most instances,
environmental regulation will not permit
tribes to wrest control of the reservation
territory back from county zoning boards.
What environmental regulatory authority
will do, however, at least in some
instances, is return to tribes some
measure of decision-making as to the uses
made of their territories.
Environmental regulation allows less than full decision-
making. Tribes may not, under environmental laws, be able
to control the existence or location of incompatible land uses.
But tribes will be able to condition those uses to impose
environmental restrictions on potentially harmful non-Indian
activities and uses. At a minimum, the Indian nations, having
lost the authority to control land use, should nonetheless be
able to oversee incompatible uses so that tribal environmental
values are preserved. Environmental regulatory authority
should permit Indian nations to re-instill tribal environmental
goals and values into land use activities in Indian country.
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